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TOWARDS A EUROPEAN SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY
JAVIER VERCHER-MOLL1
***
Regulation (EU) no. 1094/2010, which established a European
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, may involve a major
change to the management and supervision of private insurance in Spain
and in the European Union. Thus, this Article analyzes the evolution from
the original Insurance Committee, which boasted only advisory functions,
to this new Authority, which has been given decision-making functions in
addition to its advisory ones. The Article concludes by suggesting that in
the future, this new Authority will be the sole supervisory body operating in
all Member States, demonstrating a progression towards a new conception
of supervision and regulation of insurance or perhaps another step towards
Community-wide integration.
***
Key Words: European Insurance and Occupational Pensions
Authority.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The ideals which inspired the realisation of a common market and
the creation, thereby, of the European Economic Community, have meant
that the principle of harmonization has been a constant in the drawing up of
both national and Community regulatory frameworks in many sectors. The
relationship between Community law and the internal laws of each
Member State has made it possible to distinguish four functional principles,
which constitute the common central feature of the various different
legislative reforms carried out within the European Union.
The
relationships of substitution, harmonization, coordination and coexistence
between internal national law and Community law have determined the
shape and reach of a European standard, as translated into Treaties,
Regulations, and Directives.2

1

Researcher of Commercial Law, CEGEA, Universidad Politécnica de
Valencia, javermol@upv.es
2
See FERNANDO DIEZ MORENO, MANUAL DE DERECHO DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA
299-321 (5th ed, 2009); NIAL FENNELLY, THE PAST AND FUTURE OF EU LAW 37-
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Within the broad spectrum of sectors of economic activity, we can
find in the insurance sector a well-ensconced and clear distinction in terms
of private and public law. On the one hand, the private relationships that
arise between insurers and policyholders, insured parties, consumers, or
users in general, are based on private law. This, in turn, is subject to the
corresponding legal restrictions governing contracts, which may be
established for the benefit of the latter parties. On the other hand, there is
regulation of the insurers themselves; standard principles of public law that
regulate and supervise insurance activity, and finally, norms governing the
mediation or distribution of insurance risk.
The harmonization of the norms relating to financial services that
has been carried out to date (which include those governing insurance) has
had as its single objective the achievement of a Single Market in Financial
Services3 as an essential part of the common market. This harmonization
has only affected the standards concerned with supervision and regulation,
not only by the creation of positive legislation, but also through the creation
of Community institutions. However, this should not lead us to think that
such a combination of standards is ideal, since the set of standards relating
to supervision still retains features that are specific to each Member State’s
own system.4
With the aim of overcoming this imperfect coordination between
national standards,5 major efforts have been made in the direction of
bringing together and unifying the codes. Out of one of these has emerged
Regulation (EU) no. 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the
European Council of 24 November 2010, which establishes a European
Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions
Authority) as the highest authority overseeing the regulation and
supervision of private insurance at Community level.

85 (Miguel P. Maduro et al. eds., 2010); ANTONIO CALVO HORNERO,
ORGANIZACIÓN DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA 174-84 (3rd ed. 2008).
3
See RYM AYADI & CHRISTOPHER O’BRIEN, THE FUTURE OF INSURANCE
REGULATION AND SUPERVISION IN THE EU: NEW DEVELOPMENTS, NEW
CHALLENGES 53-60 (2006).
4
See LUIS FERNANDEZ DE LA GANDARA & ALFONSO-LUIS CALVO
CARAVACA, DERECHO MERCANTIL INTERNACIONAL: ESTUDIOS SOBRE DERECHO
COMUNITARIO Y DEL COMERCIO INTERNACIONAL 217-24 (2d ed. 1995).
5
See Juan Bataller Grau, Un Mercado Europeo del Seguro: Claves para una
Re-visión, in DERECHO PRIVADO EUROPEO 747–49 (Sergio Cámara Lapuente ed.,
2003).
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We should emphasize that the European Commission has played a
major role in the achievement of this shared standard. The mechanism
employed has been the creation of Committees as consultative bodies in
respect of insurance and occupational pension issues, and supervision.
This has led to the creation of a very useful body of material for overseeing
the Community’s insurance market. Together with this, we should also not
overlook the Lamfalussy process,6 which was initiated in 2001 and aimed
to facilitate the coordination of individual national legislations in terms of
supervision.
Our objective in this study is to set out the juridical significance of
the creation of this Authority and to determine, or at least clarify, the
resulting situation with respect to national legislations on insurance
supervision. The Article starts out by providing a chronological account of
the sequence of distinct stages of regulation in the Community that have
led to the Regulation, which is the object of the present study. This is why
we dwell on an analysis of the most important community standards, as
well as on reports, briefings on political contexts, and situations in which
there has been an oversight of insurance in the European Union, leading up
to the establishment of the new regulatory regime.
II.

ANTECEDENTS

The European Council,7 in the knowledge that the directives
relating to the insurance market had to be implemented, decided that it was
necessary to create an institution to support the European Commission.8 In
this respect, the Council Directive of 19 December 19919 established that
“Whereas implementing measures are necessary for the application of
Council directives on non-life insurance and life assurance; whereas, in
particular, technical adaptations may from time to time be necessary to
take account of developments in the insurance sector.” This led to the
creation of the first institution whose task was to advise the Commission on

6

For discussion of the Lamfalussy process, see infra Section VI.
See JUAN MANUEL URUBURU COLSA, HISTORIA DEL CONSEJO EUROPEO,
163–224 (2009); GUY ISAAC, MANUAL DE DERECHO COMUNITARIO GENERAL 63–
70 (4th ed. 1997).
8
See Council Decision 87/373, art. 2, 1987 O.J. (L 197) 33, 35 (EC)
(presenting procedures for implementing powers conferred on the Commission).
9
Council Directive 91/675, 1991 O.J. (L 374) 32, 33 (EC).
7
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developing legislation in the insurance sphere: appositely named, ‘the
Insurance Committee.”10
The Insurance Committee was composed of representatives of the
Member States and chaired by the representative of the Commission.11 Its
main function, beyond establishing its internal regulation, was to issue an
opinion on the draft legislation that the Commission’s representative would
submit to it. In brief, the procedure was as follows: where the European
Council, in the acts which it adopts in the field of direct non-life insurance
and direct life assurance, confers on the Commission powers for the
implementation of the rules which it lays down,12 the Commission presents
a draft of the measures, for which the Committee must deliver its opinion
within a time limit, which the chairman of the Committee may lay down.13
Furthermore, the Committee held powers, beyond those we have
already seen, to examine any question relating to the application of
Community regulations relating to the insurance sector and, in particular,
directives concerning direct insurance.14 It could issue opinions on matters
on which it was consulted by the Commission on the basis of the new
proposals that it intended to present to the Council in relation to
coordination in the sectors of direct life assurance and direct non-life
insurance. It had no powers, at any time or in any circumstances, to
consider particular problems in connection with individual insurance
companies, with the result that the Committee’s direct intervention in the
insurance market, through reports or recommendations, was precluded.15
The Commission Communication of 11 May 1999,16 entitled
"Action Plan for a Single Financial Market," established a series of
objectives and specific measures for improving the single market in

10

See JAVIER CAMACHO DE LOS RIOS, ARMONIZACIÓN DEL DERECHO DE
SEGURO DE DAÑOS EN LA UNIÓN EUROPEA 38-39 (1996).
11

Council Directive 91/675, art. 1, 1991 O.J. (L 374) 32, 33 (EC).
Id. at art. 2.1.
13
Id. at art. 2.2.
14
The expression “direct insurance” is usually used to refer to the premiums
obtained through direct contracting with the insured. It must be distinguished of
reinsurance contract, because the reinsurance is based in giving protection between
insurers. In the reinsurance, an insurer gives protection to another insurer if it
cannot cover the risk assumed in the insurance contract with the insured.
15
Council Directive 91/675, art. 3, 1991 O.J. (L 374) 32, 33 (EC).
16
Financial Services Commission Proposed Action Plan for Single Financial
Market, COM (1999) 327 final (May 11, 1999).
12
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financial services.17 Strategic measures aimed to create a single market in
wholesale financial services, the development of open, secure, retail
financial service markets, to guarantee the stability of EU financial markets
by using best practices in the matter of preventative and supervisory
regulation, and finally, to eliminate the fiscal obstacles to financial market
integration. One of the Commission’s main objectives was to achieve
conformity with the Framework for Action18 that the Commission itself had
presented in October 1998, given that the introduction of the Euro was one
of the main foundations on which the single market would be built.
However, in addition, there was also the key matter of restructuring the
financial services sector, since the conflicting national legislations did not
provide a stable legal framework.19
Leading on from this, one of the immediate consequences of these
was the harmonization of the different national legislations in those areas
that, although not specifically concerned with financial services, were
intrinsically related, since they affected the clients of these services. In
effect, adaptation, specialisation, and technical and legal improvements
have consistently characterized developments in consumer and user
protection legislation right up to the present day.
III.

THE CREATION OF NEW COMMITTEES

Continuing the historical progress, on 17 July 2000, the European
Council set up the so-called Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of
European Securities Markets. In its final report, the Committee of Wise
Men called for the establishment of a four-level regulatory framework in
order to make the regulatory process for Community securities legislation
more flexible, effective, and transparent.20 In its Resolution, the Stockholm
European Council of 23 and 24 March 2001 welcomed the report of the
Committee of Wise Men and called for a four-level approach to be
17

Id. at 1 (quoting Mario Monti, the Financial Services Commissioner: it is
“crucial that the Single Market for financial services delivers its full potential for
consumers, in terms of a broad range of safe, competitive products, and for
industry, in terms inter alia of easier access to a single deep and liquid market for
investment capital, as well as for financial service operators themselves”).
18
Financial Services Commission Proposed Framework for Action, COM
(1999) 941 final (Oct. 28, 1998).
19
See PAUL P. CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, E.U. LAW. TEXT, CASES AND
MATERIALS 604–35 (4th ed. 2008).
20
For discussion of the Lamfalussy process, see infra Section VI.
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implemented.21 The object of postulating these four levels was none other
than to establish an integrated securities market which required action on
legislation, on implementation measures, implantation in national law, and
measures to ensure compliance with the laws issued by the competent
Community authorities.
The organizations created by the European Commission were set
up to establish appropriate teams of staff with the technical resources to
carry out the task of producing recommendations and advice as to how the
convergence of the national laws should be achieved. The gradual
construction of this network of supranational institutions continued, and it
was in June 2001 that the Commission adopted new Decisions,22 which
established the Committee of European Securities Regulators and the
European Securities Committee, respectively. Both Committees were
designed to function as independent entities to reflect upon, debate, and
provide advice about issues relating to securities for the Commission.
They were also to contribute to the coherent, exact, and timely application
of Community legislation in the Member States, ensuring more effective
cooperation between national supervisory authorities, and carrying out
evaluations with respect to consistency and good practice. They were to
organize their own operating systems, and maintain close operating links
with the Commission and the European Securities Committee. Finally,
they were to set up their own internal regulations and fully respect both the
institutional prerogatives and the institutional balance established by the
Treaty.23 Furthermore, in particular, the Committee of European Securities
Regulators was charged with consulting widely and at an early date, with
parties active in the market, the consumers and ultimate users, in an open
and transparent manner.24 As to their composition, with the aim of
21

For a more thorough discussion of the legal reasons in favor of establishing
a new organizational structure for financial services committees, see Council
Directive 2005/1, ¶ 1–4, 2005 O.J. (L 79) 9 (EU).
22
Commission Decision 2001/527, 2001 O.J. (L 191) 43, 44 (EC);
Commission Decision 2001/528, 2001 O.J. (L 191) 45, 46 (EC).
23
Compare Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 1 with,
Treaty of Nice, Feb. 25, 2001, 2001 O.J. (C 80) 1.
24
Commission Decision 2001/527, (8)–(12), 2001 O.J. (L 191) 43 (EC) (“(8)
The Committee of European Securities Regulators should serve as an independent
body for reflection, debate and advice for the Commission in the securities field.
(9) The Committee of European Securities Regulators should also contribute to the
consistent and timely implementation of Community legislation in the Member
States by securing more effective cooperation between national supervisory
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facilitating regulatory convergence, the Commission indicated in both
Decisions that membership of these organizations should consist of highlevel representatives from the national public authorities competent in the
field of securities.
As we can see, both the European Council and the Commission
were of the view that the establishment of Committees made up of
qualified national representatives represented a significant element in
promoting the regulatory convergence of the different national bodies of
legislation. The objective was clear: to smooth away difficulties with the
aim of creating regulatory uniformity, and of drawing up a single text
applicable in all Member States.
IV.

THE GRADUAL CONSTRUCTION OF A SINGLE MARKET

The European Parliament has also pointed out, on numerous
occasions, that the creation of a single market in financial services,
consistent with an open market and free competition, is crucial for
increasing economic growth and for the creation of employment in the
Community. In 2002, it approved Resolutions for each,25 which defined the
regulatory framework for the four level approach concerning the regulation
of European securities markets, and sought to broaden certain aspects of
this approach to apply to the banking and insurance sectors, following the
clear commitment on the part of the European Council to guarantee an
appropriate institutional balance.

authorities, carrying out peer reviews and promoting best practice. (10) The
Committee of European Securities Regulators should organise its own operational
arrangements and maintain close operational links with the Commission and the
European Securities Committee. It should elect its chairperson from among its
members. (11) The Committee of European Securities Regulators should consult
extensively and at an early stage with market participants, consumers and endusers in an open and transparent manner. (12) The Committee of European
Securities Regulators should draw up its own rules of procedure and fully respect
the prerogatives of the institutions and the institutional balance established by the
Treaty.”). Commission Decision 2001/528, (9)–(10), 2001 O.J. (L191) 45 (EC)
(“(9) The European Securities Committee should serve as a body for reflection,
debate and advice for the Commission in the field of securities. (10) The European
Securities Committee should adopt its own rules of procedure.”).
25
See generally Resolution on Prudential Supervision in the European Union,
EUR. PARL. DOC. (2001/2247 (INI)); EUR. PARL. DOC. (2002/2061(INI)).
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The Resolution dated 5 February 2002, was extremely important in
terms of legislative procedure, of transparency for the different parties
operating in the financial services market,26 and in the right of supervision.
The Parliament itself urged, with a view to speed up the establishment of
an integrated securities market, that the deadlines for the transposition of
Community acts into national law should be reduced. Furthermore, in
relation to transparency27 it considered it essential that the general public
should be able to access, particularly via the Internet, as much information
as possible about all the legislative initiatives and activities of the
committees, in particular those of the market regulators committee.
Regarding the second European Parliament Resolution, of 21
November 2002, this put forward the view that the series of financial
scandals in the United States evidenced the failure of the United States’
regulatory network to eliminate the risk of sudden and unexpected financial
crises. Consequently, they concluded that there was absolutely nothing to
suggest that Europe was immune to these dramatic crises, especially
considering that Europe was in a transitional stage while in the process of
moving from a fragmented system of individual national markets to a
single unified financial market; a transition that today, with the first decade
of the twenty-first century already in the past, is still not complete.
The Parliament understood that the supervision of insurance
companies and pension funds should be brought together, without
prejudicing the distinct characteristics of each, while respecting the
national structures that were already optimal, since the ability of national
banking and insurance systems to survive – or not – in the enormously
volatile climate of those years would provide a useful indication of the
relative efficiency of the national supervisory systems. Furthermore, with
regard to the subject of the present study, the Parliament required that
national supervisory agencies should focus on “real time supervision” of
financial organizations but without succumbing to the temptation to
constantly interfere with the business actually at hand, since this would
both create obstacles to innovation and would place risks of an ethical
nature before the senior executives of the institutions under supervision.

26

See generally José Miguel Rodríguez Fernández, Los Conglomerados
Financieros y su Supervisión: Una Perspectiva en el Contexto de la Unión
Europea, 31 REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS EUROPEOS 71, 75–96 (2002), available at
http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/232.
27
See Commission Regulation 1049/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 145) 43 (EC).
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Finally, on December 3, 2002, the European Council invited the
Commission to apply these agreements in the areas of banking, insurance
and occupational pensions, and to create new committees with a
consultative remit in relation to these areas of activity as soon as possible.
Subsequently, on 5 November 2003, the Commission adopted Decision
2004/9/EC,28 which established the European Insurance and Occupational
Pensions Committee. However, its implementation was also dependent on
a Directive deleting the purely consultative functions of the Insurance
Committee.29
In conclusion, coupled with the creation of the Committees, it was
imperative to acquire a firm commitment on the part of the Member States.
In effect, overcoming the fragmentation of the market and promoting
convergence by respecting transition deadlines, for example, were
unconditional obligations. As we can see, the first years of the twenty-first
century represent an important milestone on the way to the achievement of
the single market, but also show insufficient progress to date in the field of
financial services.

28

Commission Decision 2004/9, 2004 O.J. (L 3) 34 (EC). The reader has to
distinguish the Decision 2004/9/EC and the Decision 2004/6/EC. The first one
refers to the “European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Committee,” and the
second one refers to the “Committee of European Insurance and Occupational
Pensions Supervisors.”
29
Id. at (5) (“The Commission has proposed a Directive modifying, inter alia,
Directive 91/675/EEC, First Council Directive 73/239/EEC of 24 July 1973 on the
coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the
taking-up and pursuit of the business of direct insurance other than life assurance
(4) as amended, Directive 2002/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 5 November 2002 concerning life assurance (5), and Directive
2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2002
on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and
investment firms in a financial conglomerate and amending Council Directives
73/239/EEC, 79/267/EEC, 92/49/EEC, 92/96/EEC, 93/6/EEC and 93/22/EEC, and
Directives 98/78/EC and 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and the Council
(6), to delete the advisory functions of the Insurance Committee.”).

182

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 21.1

V.

THE EUROPEAN INSURANCE AND OCCUPATIONAL
PENSIONS COMMITTEE PURSUANT TO COMMISSION
DECISION 2004/9/EC OF 5 NOVEMBER 2003

Moreover, we should remember that the European Insurance and
Occupational Pensions Committee did not begin to function30 until a
Directive repealing the purely consultative functions of the Insurance
Committee came into force. With respect to this, Directive 2005/1/EC31 of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2005 fulfils that
mandate.
Article 5 of this latter Directive amended Directive 91/675/EEC,
with regard to the powers assumed by the Insurance Committee, and
renamed it the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Committee.
This more elaborate denomination for the new incarnation of the Insurance
Committee had the purpose of clarifying its sphere of activity in relation to
the old Insurance Committee.
A.

LEGAL AUTHORITY

Reading the text of the articles of Decision 2004/9/EC, I deduce
that the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Committee has two
types of legal authority. The first covered its own organization and dealt
with its internal structure and procedural regime while the second dealt
with its actual substantive functions, which were meant to establish, in
addition to the actual attributed powers themselves, the objectives that it
should pursue.
In relation to the first type of legal authority, in its Decision the
Commission lays down that the Committee shall be composed of highlevel representatives of Member States, and chaired by a representative of
the Commission. But the Decision does not specify who these high level
representatives shall be, or the method of their appointment, leaving this at
the discretion of the Committee itself. On the other hand, the Decision did
30

See id. at art. 5.
See Commission Decision 2009/79, (2), 2009 O.J. (L 25) 28 (EC) (referring
to “Directive 2005/1/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 9
March 2005, amending Directives 73/239/EEC, 85/611/EEC, 91/675/EEC,
92/49/EEC and 93/6/EEC of the Council and Directives 94/19/EC, 98/78/EC,
2000/12/EC, 2001/34/EC, 2002/83/EC and 2002/87/EC, in order to establish a new
organisational structure for financial services committees”).
31
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take away from the Committee the power to appoint its own secretariat,
since this was incumbent on the Commission itself. As per its rules of
procedure, the Decision empowered the Committee to draw up its own
internal rules of procedure, but it also imposed an obligation to meet both
at regular intervals and impulsively whenever the situation demanded.
Furthermore, the Commission had the power to convene an emergency
meeting if it considered that the situation so required.32
With regards to its substantive functions, the Committee was
authorized to advise the Commission, at the latter’s request, “on policy
issues relating to insurance, reinsurance and occupational pensions as well
as Commission proposals in these fields,” and to examine “any question
relating to the application of Community provisions concerning the sectors
of insurance, reinsurance and occupational pensions, and in particular
Directives on insurance, reinsurance and occupational pensions.” The
Decision denied the Committee decision-making powers relating to
specific matters concerned with, or affecting, the Community’s business
organizations and citizens. In effect, the Committee could not consider
specific problems relating to individual insurance or reinsurance
undertakings, nor to occupational pensions institutions, nor could it address
labour and social law aspects such as the organization of occupational
regimes, in particular compulsory membership and the results of collective
bargaining agreements.33
B.

RELATED CONCEPTS

It is important to avoid confusing the different Committees
operating at that time within the European Commission. In effect, and
quite distinct from the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions
Committee, which is the subject of this Article, at that time was the
Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors,
which was instituted on 5 November 2003. The confusion of the two even
affected the wording of Decision 2004/9/EC itself, as evidenced by the
reference to the Committee of Supervisors, when Article 3.2 mentions the
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Committee.
According to Article 2 of Decision 2004/6/EC, the functions of the
Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors
32

See Commission Decision 2004/9, art. 3, 4, 2004 O.J. (L 25) 28, 30–31

(EU).

33

See id. at art. 2.
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are first to advise the Commission, either at the Commission’s request,
within a time limit which the Commission may lay down according to the
urgency of the matter, or on the Committee’s own initiative, in particular
regarding the preparation of draft implementing measures in the fields of
insurance, reinsurance, and occupational pensions. Secondly, it shall
contribute to the consistent implementation of Community Directives, and
to the convergence of Member States’ supervisory practices throughout the
Community.
Finally, it shall constitute a forum for supervisory
cooperation, including the exchange of information on supervised
institutions.
Besides, the Article 4 of Decision 2004/6/EC established that “the
Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors
shall maintain close operational links with the Commission and with the
Committee established by Decision 2004/9/EC”; which is to say, with the
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Committee. This meant
that there were two institutions with similar titles, practically identical
functions, and the power to report on the same matters.34 This state of
affairs was later changed with the publication of Commission Decision
2009/79/EC, broadening the powers of the Committee of Supervisors.
From a reading of the articles contained in both Decisions, we can
draw the conclusion that there are no major differences in terms of their
functions. It is certainly the case that Decision number 9 creates a
Committee whose purpose is to advise on insurance policy and to scrutinize
Community standards in this area. By contrast, Decision number 6 also
addresses insurance, but from a supervisory perspective. In our view, there
is no substantial difference between the two bodies because there is no
demarcation of any clear division of powers between them. It was
unnecessary to establish two Committees, since their functions could have
been brought together in one, thereby avoiding the misunderstandings that
might arise in the dealings between the two organizations.
On the other hand, it could be argued that there is a point to
creating two separate Committees, if we consider that the European
Committee of Supervisors establishes the basis of what would later
constitute the supervisory institutions that are the subject of the present
study. In effect, Decision 2004/6/EC was repealed by Commission
Decision 2009/79/EC, and the latter, in turn, by the Regulation whereby a
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority was created.
What is certain is that, if we analyze the three regulations mentioned, we
34

Id. at art. 3.2.
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see that each organization takes on the responsibilities of its predecessor,
and increases its powers. This is demonstrated by the fact that the new
European Authority has the previous Committees’ consultative functions
and, as we shall see, in a new development it is given certain powers of
decision, which enable us to glimpse the likely shape of a future Financial
Services Supervisory Authority.
THE LAMFALUSSY PROCESS35

VI.

The Lamfalussy process36 began in 2001, with the intention of
establishing an effective mechanism to enable European supervisory
practices to begin to converge, and to ensure that Community financial
services legislation would be able to adapt, rapidly and flexibly, to the
evolution of the internal market. A consequence of this was the issuing of
Commission Decision 2004/6/EC which, as we have already seen,
established a Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions
Supervisors, in the guise of an “independent body for reflection, debate and
advice for the Commission in the insurance, reinsurance and occupational
pensions’ fields.”37
Within this process, in 2004 when the legislative phase of the
Financial Services Action Plan (“FSAP”) was almost complete, the
Commission decided to carry out an evaluation of the integration of
European financial markets and to instigate a general consultation, based
on the reports of four high level groups of experts. The Green Paper on
Financial Services Policy, with which a public consultation was launched
on May 3, 2005, was fundamentally centered on the application of existing
measures and in cooperation, rather than in putting forward proposals for
new laws. The Green Paper on Financial Services Policy (2005-2010)38 set
forth the general policy objectives39 for financial services for the period
2005 to 2010. The purpose of this Paper was none other than to
35

See generally Duncan Alford, The Lamfalussy Process and EU Bank
Regulation: Another Step on the Road to Pan-European Regulation?, 25 ANN.
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 389, 389–416 (2006).
36
It takes its name from the President of the advisory committee that set it up
in March 2001, Alexandre Lamfalussy.
37
See Commission Decision 2004/6, (4), 2004 O.J. (L 3) 31 (EU).
38
Commission Green Paper on Financial Services Policy 2005-2010, COM
(2005) 177 final (May 5, 2005).
39
Id. at 3 (indicating that the Paper merely sets out “preliminary views of the
Commission for its financial services policy priorities”).
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consolidate the progress towards an integrated, open, competitive,
economically efficient European financial market, and to remove any
remaining economically significant barriers to it. It sought to stimulate the
development of a market in which financial services and capital could
circulate freely throughout the EU at the lowest possible cost (with
adequate and effective levels of prudential control, financial stability, and
strong consumer protection). Further, it would apply, enforce, and carry
out continuous evaluation of the existing legislative framework, rigorously
implement the optimal regulatory agenda for any future initiatives, further
supervisory convergence, and consolidate Europe’s influence in global
financial markets.
The White Paper that emerged from it was designated for
integrating the financial services market as its highest priority. In the
White Paper on Financial Services 2005-201040 of December 1, the
Commission established the key objectives of its policy for the following
five years, namely, consolidating progress achieved to date, completing
unfinished business, enhancing supervisory cooperation and convergence,
and removing the remaining barriers to integration. But more than this, in
the document the following priorities were laid down: to continue to
improve the efficiency of pan-European markets for long-term savings
products, to establish the retail internal market, and improve the efficacy of
the risk capital market.
The dynamic consolidation of financial services was based on the
principle of producing better legislation by mandatory open consultation,
and of impact analyses for new legislative proposals as central procedural
features, as well as the ex-post evaluation of all legislative measures.
Furthermore, the EC regulatory and supervisory structures were subject to
review with the aim of improving their effectiveness in achieving
convergence. Finally, taking into account the international context in
which today’s regulation on accounting practice, audit, and capital and
reserves is set, the EU was of the view that it was essential for it to
undertake a major role in the worldwide process of standardization and,
specifically, in favor of opening up world markets for financial services.
The Commission at this time proposed a dialogue between the EU and US
financial markets, and to broaden the cooperation to include other
countries, such as Japan, China, Russia, and India. The EU was desired to
be very visibly represented in international organizations, and was to speak
40

Commission White Paper on Financial Services Policy 2005-2010, COM
(2005) 629 final (Dec. 1, 2005).
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with a single voice on complex matters such as money laundering, the
financing of terrorism, and tax fraud.
In accordance with this new approach, financial regulation was
initially passed in two levels. But subsequent to the major reform
introduced by Directive 2005/1/EC, the Lamfalussy process envisioned EU
financial regulation as unfolding in four distinct levels or phases.
At Level 1, framework legislation setting out the core principles
and defining implementing powers would be adopted by co-decision by
European Parliament and the European Council,41 after a full and inclusive
consultation process in line with the best regulatory practices.
At Level 2, the technical details of the legislation would be adopted
after a vote of the competent regulatory Committee (the European
Securities Committee, the European Banking Committee, and the European
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Committee).42
At Level 3, these three Committees would have an important role
to contribute to consistent and convergent implementation of EU directives
by securing more effective cooperation between national supervisors and
the convergence of supervisory practices.
Finally, in Level 4, the Commission would enforce the timely and
correct transposition of EU legislation into national law level.43
VII.

REVIEW OF THE LAMFALUSSY PROCESS

In line with the aforementioned Directive 2005/1/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2005 amending
Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 85/611/EEC, 91/675/EEC, 92/49/EEC and
93/6/EEC, and Directives 94/19/EC, 98/78/EC, 2000/12/EC, 2001/34/EC,
2002/83/EC and 2002/87/EC in order to establish a new organizational
structure for financial services committees, the Commission carried out a
review of the Lamfalussy process in 2007 and presented its assessment in a
41

Nowadays, that process is known as “Ordinary Legislative Procedure.”
See Commission Decision 2001/527, 2001 O.J. (L 191) 43 (EC) amended by
Commission Decision 2004/6, 2004 O.J. (L 3) 32 (EU); Commission Decision
2004/5, 2004 O.J. (L3) 28 (EU); Commission Decision 2004/6, 2004 O.J. (L3) 30
(EU).
43
See Communication from the Commission to the Council and European
Parliament, at 1–2, COM (2007) 722 final (Nov. 20, 2007) (indicating where the
Lamfalussy process is reviewed through the mandate established in Directive
2005/1/EC).
42
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Communication of 20 November 2007, entitled “Review of the Lamfalussy
process — Strengthening supervisory convergence.”
The Communication of 20 November 2007 detailed the current
situation in terms of the four levels, and determined individual measures to
mitigate the defects affecting each of the levels in Annex III. The measures
were calculated to improve both the legislative process itself and the
application of the legislation. This is why it was stated that Member States
must refrain from adopting any additional national measures in those areas
which, because of the legislative level of the Community regulation in
question, transposition was required on the part of the Member States. The
fundamental objective was to increase transparency insofar as transposition
was concerned. This was based on levels 1 and 2 that we have already
detailed.
The measures contained in Annex III of the Communication were
also designed to improve supervisory cooperation and convergence. What
was essential was the strengthening of the level 3 Committees – the
European Securities Committee, the European Banking Committee, and the
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Committee. From a
political perspective, the Committees were expected to deliver more results,
and the national supervisors were expected to expand their missions to
include a cooperation and convergence requirement at European level. The
hope was that reducing the practical obstacles at European and national
levels would strengthen mutual trust and the implementation of the
measures. Decision-making, especially of the Committees of Regulators,
would also be facilitated and carry more authority (even if non-binding) in
relation to the national regulators and supervisors.44
While reviewing the functionality of the Lamfalussy process, the
European Council45 invited the Commission to clarify the role of the
Committees of Supervisors and consider all different options to strengthen
the working of those Committees, without upsetting the current
institutional structure or reducing the accountability of supervisors.
During its meeting of March 13 and 14, 2008, the European
Council called for swift improvements to the functioning of the
Committees of Supervisors.
44

See id. at 6.
See, e.g., Press Release 15698/07, Council of European Union, Emp’t, Soc.
Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs
(Dec. 4, 2007), available at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/
docs/pressData/en/ecofin/9
7420.pdf.
45
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On May 14, 2008, the European Council invited the Commission
to revise the Commission Decisions establishing the Committees of
Supervisors to ensure coherence and consistency in their mandates and
tasks as well as strengthen their contributions to supervisory cooperation
and convergence. The Council noted that specific tasks could be explicitly
given to the Committees to foster supervisory cooperation and
convergence, and their role in assessing risks to financial stability.46
To summarize, the idea of broadening the Committees’ powers was
clear. The Commission itself called for the political will that was inherent
in the Committees’ development, and this already showed signs of the
changes in responsibility and function that these institutions would
undergo.
VIII.

THE COMMITTEE OF EUROPEAN INSURANCE AND
OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS SUPERVISORS PURSUANT TO
COMMISSION DECISION 2009/79/EC OF 23 JANUARY 2009

Article 16 of Decision 2009/79/EC repealed Decision 2004/6/EC
and defined a new configuration for the Committee of Insurance and
Occupational Pensions Supervisors by broadening its powers and
responsibilities, starting from the premise that it was not a decision-making
body, since it had no regulatory powers at Community level. All in all, its
function was to carry out peer reviews, to promote best practices, and to
issue non-binding guidelines, recommendations and standards in order to
increase convergence across the Community, contributing to the common
and uniform day-to-day implementation of Community legislation and its
consistent application by the supervisory authorities.
The Committee of Insurance and Occupational Pensions
Supervisors was constituted as an independent advisory group of the
Commission in the insurance, reinsurance, and occupational pensions fields
– although, in this latter case, the Decision made it clear that it should not
address labour and social law aspects, such as the organization of
occupational regimes, and in particular, issues relating to compulsory
membership (affiliation) or collective agreements.

46

See Commission Decision 2009/79, (4)–(6), 2009 O.J. (L 25) 28 (EU).
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On the other hand, the Committee’s mandate should cover the
supervision of financial conglomerates.47 To avoid duplication of work, to
prevent any inconsistencies, to keep the Committee abreast of progress, and
to give it the opportunity to exchange information, the Committee was
instructed to work with the Committee of European Banking Supervisors in
the supervision of financial conglomerates, to be exercised thorough the
Joint Committee on Financial Conglomerates.48
Financial systems in the Community are closely linked and events
in one Member State can have a significant impact on financial institutions
and markets in other Member States. The continuing emergence of
financial conglomerates and the blurring of distinctions between the
activities of firms in the banking, securities, and insurance sectors give rise
to additional supervisory challenges at the national and Community level.
In order to safeguard financial stability, a system is needed at the level of
the Committee of Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors, the
Committee of European Banking Supervisors, and the Committee of
European Securities Regulators in order to identify potential risks, across
borders and across sectors, at an early stage and where necessary, to inform
the Commission and the other Committees. Furthermore, it is essential that
the Committee keep finance ministries and national central banks of the
Member States informed. The Committee has its role to play in this respect
by identifying risks in the insurance, reinsurance, and occupational pension
sectors and regularly reporting on the outcome to the Commission. The
Council should also be informed of these assessments.
A.

FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMITTEE OF EUROPEAN INSURANCE
AND OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS SUPERVISORS

From reading the articles in the Decision, we can identify three
main functions of the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational
Pensions Supervisors. First, the Decision established a list of the
Committee’s functions in relation to multilateral cooperation between
national supervisory authorities, which it developed in great detail.
Second, the Committee is invested with powers of technical advice. The

47

Council Directive 2002/87, 2003 O.J. (L 35) 1 (EU) (defining financial
conglomerates as “financial groups which provide services and products in
different sectors of the financial markets”).
48
See Commission Decision 2009/79, (7)–(10) 2009 O.J. (L 25), 25–26 (EU).
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final function concerns the nature of the relationship between the
Committee and the other supervisory Committees.
Outside of these three functions, in accordance with Article 13, the
Committee was to establish an annual work program and transmit it to the
European Council, the European Parliament and the Commission by the
end of October each year. The Committee was to periodically and at least
annually inform the Council, the European Parliament, and the
Commission on the achievement of the activities set out in the work
program.
1. Cooperation Between Supervisory Authorities
With respect to the first function, the review of the Lamfalussy
process established that the Member States also have a key role to play in
guaranteeing the full implementation of the standards and guidelines in
relation to proposals designed to strengthen cooperation between home and
host regulators. The action of the Commission is intended to raise
awareness, and evaluate and adopt measures (delegation of functions,
protocol for multilateral agreements, functioning of the principal
supervisory authority, etc.).
On this basis, Article 4 of the Decision charged the Committee
with one of its most important functions, which is to enhance cooperation
between national supervisory authorities in the insurance, reinsurance, and
occupational pensions fields and foster the convergence of Member States’
supervisory practices and approaches throughout the Community. To this
effect, it shall carry out the following tasks:
a) mediate or facilitate mediation between supervisory authorities
in cases specified in the relevant legislation or at the request of a
supervisory authority;
b) provide opinions to supervisory authorities in cases specified in
the relevant legislation or at their request;
c) promote the effective bilateral and multilateral exchange of
information between supervisory authorities, subject to applicable
confidentiality provisions;
d) facilitate the delegation of tasks between supervisory authorities,
in particular by identifying tasks can be delegated and by promoting best
practices;
e) contribute to ensuring the efficient and consistent functioning of
colleges of supervisors, in particular through setting guidelines for the
operational functioning of colleges, monitoring the coherence of the
practices of the different colleges and sharing good practices; and
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f) contribute to developing high quality and common supervisory
reporting standards;
g) review the practical application of the non-binding guidelines,
recommendations and standards issued by the Committee.
Additionally, within this same principle of convergence, the
Committee was charged with reviewing the Member States’ supervisory
practices and assess their convergence on an ongoing basis. The
Committee was to report annually on progress achieved and identify the
remaining obstacles.
The Committee was also charged with developing new practical
convergence tools to promote the common supervisory approaches. This is
an extremely important role, calculated to compensate for any deficiencies
in Directives, since these cannot prevent the existence, on occasion, of
differences between the final legislations in the different Member States.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the Decision emphasizes that
the exchange of information between the supervisory authorities is
fundamental to their functions. This exchange is central to the efficient
supervision of insurance groups and for financial stability. While insurance
legislation imposes clear legal obligations on supervisory authorities to
cooperate and exchange information, the Committee was to facilitate
practical day-to-day exchange of information between them, subject to
relevant confidentiality provisions set out in applicable legislation.49
2. The Committee’s Typical Function: Advising
With respect to the second function, in Article 4, the Decision
charges the Committee with a broad range of responsibilities for technical
advice, in particular, with respect to the preparation of draft implementing
measures in the fields of insurance, reinsurance, occupational pensions and
financial conglomerates. In this case, the Commission has the power to lay
down the time limit within which the Committee shall provide such advice.
Moreover, according to Articles 3 and 5, under the principle of
convergence, the Committee shall contribute to the common and uniform
implementation and consistent application of Community legislation by
issuing guidelines, recommendations and standards. In pursuit of this, it is
given a power of active oversight, monitoring, and assessing developments
in the insurance, reinsurance, and occupational pensions sector. It is also to
49

(EU).

See Commission Decision 2009/79, (15), (18), (19), 2009 O.J. (L 25) 29
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ensure that the finance ministries and national central banks of the Member
States are informed about potential or imminent problems.
The Committee shall, at least twice a year, provide to the
Commission assessments of micro-prudential trends, potential risks, and
vulnerabilities in the insurance, reinsurance, and occupational pensions
sector.
3. Relationship Between Related Supervisors
With respect to the third function, the Decision charged the
Committee, not only with coordinating with the national supervisory
authorities, but also with cooperating with the various institutions that carry
out a similar task to that of the Committee in matters related to the financial
framework. In effect, Articles 5, 6, and 9 of the Decision state that the
Committee shall cooperate closely with the Committee of European
Securities Regulators, the Committee of European Banking Supervisors,
and the Banking Supervision Committee of the European System of
Central Banks, and contribute to the development of common supervisory
practices in the field of insurance, reinsurance, and occupational pensions
as well as on a cross-sectoral basis.
To this effect, it was in particular to establish sectoral and crosssectoral training programmes to facilitate personnel exchanges and to
encourage competent authorities to intensify the use of secondment
schemes, joint inspection teams, and supervisory visits and other tools.
B.

COMPOSITION

The Decision, in Article 7, states that the Committee shall be
composed of high-level representatives from the national public authorities
competent in the field of supervision of insurance, reinsurance, and
occupational pensions. Each Member State shall designate a high level
representative from its competent authorities to participate in the meetings
of the Committee. The Decision does not define what is meant by a high
level representative, which could lead to differences in interpretation on the
part of the different Member States, and the consequent attendance of
representatives with different levels of technical expertise, despite their all
being “high level.” The Chair shall be elected from among the Committee
members.
The members are enjoined not to disclose information covered by
the obligation of professional secrecy. All participants in the discussions
shall be obliged to comply with the applicable rules of professional
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secrecy. Whenever the discussion of an item on the agenda should entail
the exchange of confidential information concerning a supervised
institution, participation in that discussion may be restricted to members
directly involved.
The Committee, according to Article 14, shall operate by
consensus of its members. If no consensus can be reached, a qualified
majority shall make decisions. The votes of the representatives of the
Members of the Committee shall correspond to the votes of the Member
States as laid down in Articles 205(2) and (4) of the Treaty.50 Finally, the
Committee shall adopt its own rules of procedure, and organize its own
operational arrangements.
IX.

REGULATION (EU) NO. 1094/2010 OF THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL OF 24 NOVEMBER
2010, ESTABLISHING A EUROPEAN SUPERVISORY
AUTHORITY
(EUROPEAN
INSURANCE
AND
OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS AUTHORITY), AMENDING
DECISION NO. 716/2009/EC AND REPEALING COMMISSION
DECISION 2009/79/EC51

The financial crisis that we are presently undergoing has exposed
weaknesses in cooperation, coordination, and consistency in the application
of Community law, and in the mutual confidence between national
supervisors.
The Commission, the Parliament, and the Council have always
been aware that the Committees that have been established up to the
present day have been no more than consultative bodies, with undoubted
importance in relation to the quality of their technical advice, but without
the power to take decisions. However, the effort made in Decision
2009/79/EC to set up the Committee as a body with a major impact in the
field of insurance and occupational pensions supervision is praiseworthy.

50

Articles 205.2 and 205.4 should be read according to the amendments
introduced by the Act of Accession of 2003, which introduces amendments to
Primary Law, as a result of the Accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and of
Romania to the European Union. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the
European Union, Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (C 321) 327.
51
Commission Regulation 1092/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 48– 83.
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On 25 February 2009, a group of experts, under the chairmanship
of J. de Larosière, published a report52 at the behest of the Commission.
The report concluded that the supervisory framework needed to be
strengthened, and recommended the creation of a European System of
Financial Supervisors, consisting of three European Supervisory
Authorities: one in the insurance and occupational pensions sector, one in
the banking sector, and the third in the securities sector, as well as a
European Systemic Risk Board.
The European Council, in its conclusions dated 19 June 2009,
recommended the creation of a European System of Financial Supervisors,
consisting of three new European Supervisory Authorities. This system
should focus on improving the quality and cohesiveness of national
supervision, strengthening control over transnational business groups, and
establishing a single EU rule book applicable to all financial institutions in
the single market. The European Council emphasized that the European
Supervisory Authorities should also have supervisory powers for credit
ratings agencies. The Council invited the Commission to present concrete
proposals as to the manner in which the European System of Financial
Supervisors53 would be able to take firm action in critical situations,
making the point that the decisions adopted by the European Supervisory
Authorities should not have any effect on the budgetary responsibilities of
the individual Member States.
The European Supervisory Authorities are intended to replace the
Committee of European Banking Supervisors established by Commission
Decision 2009/78/EC, the Committee of European Insurance and
Occupational Pensions Supervisors established by Commission Decision
2009/79/EC, and the Committee of European Securities Regulators
established by Commission Decision 2009/77/EC, and assume all the tasks
and powers of those Committees.54

52

THE DE LAROSIÈRE GROUP, THE HIGH-LEVEL GROUP ON FINANCIAL
SUPERVISION IN THE EU (Feb. 25, 2009).
53
See A.J. Tapia Hermida, La Nueva Estructura Centralizada de Supervisión
de los Mercados Financieros en la Unión Europea: Las Propuestas Regulatorias
de la Comisión 23 de Septiembre de 2009 para la Creación del Consejo Europeo
de Riesgo Sistémico y del Sistema Europeo de Supervisores Financieros, 116
REVISTA DE DERECHO BANCARIO Y BURSÁTIL 209, 296–97 (2009).
54
See Commission Regulation 1094/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 58 (EU). (“The
Authority (EIOPA) shall form part of a European System of Financial Supervision
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UNDERLYING LEGAL AUTHORITY

At the outset, it is necessary to consider the legislative approval
process under which this new EIOPA is established. Article 95 of the EC
Treaty55 was chosen as the underpinning of its creation. The purpose of
this precept is to facilitate the actions of the Council, the Commission, and
the Parliament, within their respective competences, with the objective of

(ESFS). The main objective of the ESFS shall be to ensure that the rules applicable
to the financial sector are adequately implemented to preserve financial stability
and to ensure confidence in the financial system as a whole and sufficient
protection for the customers of financial services. The ESFS shall comprise the
following: the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) for the purposes of the tasks
as specified in Commission Regulation (EU) 1092/2010 and this Regulation; the
Commission Authority (EIOPA); the European Supervisory Authority (European
Banking Authority) established by Commission Regulation (EU) 1093/2010 and
the European Parliament and of the Council; the European Supervisory Authority
(European Securities and Markets Authority) established by Regulation (EU)
1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council; the Joint Committee of
the European Supervisory Authorities (Joint Committee) for the purposes of
carrying out the tasks as specified in Articles 54 to 57 of this Regulation, of
Commission Regulation (EU) 1093/2010 and of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010;
the competent or supervisory authorities in the Member States as specified in the
Union acts referred to in Article 1 of this Regulation, of Regulation (EU) No
1093/2010 and of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. The Authority shall cooperate
regularly and closely with the ESRB as well as with the European Supervisory
Authority (European Banking Authority) and the European Supervisory Authority
(European Securities and Markets Authority) through the Joint Committee,
ensuring cross-sectoral consistency of work and reaching joint positions in the area
of supervision of financial conglomerates and on other cross-sectoral issues. In
accordance with the principle of sincere cooperation under Article 4 of the Treaty
on European Union, the parties to the ESFS shall cooperate with trust and full
mutual respect, in particular in ensuring the flow of appropriate and reliable
information between them. Those supervisory authorities that are party to the
ESFS shall be obliged to supervise financial institutions operating in the Union in
accordance with the acts referred to in Article 1”).
55
Today it is known as Article 114 in the consolidated versions of the Treaty
on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as
well as their Protocols and Annexes, resulting from the amendments introduced by
the Treaty of Lisbon, signed on 13 December 2007 in Lisbon, that took effect on 1
December 2009. Commission Regulation 1094/2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 94 (EU).
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assimilating the different national systems of legislation.56 The new
Authority is established in accordance with the aforesaid, and by means of
co-decision.
However, the most important question is if the European
Commission, Council, and Parliament have enough powers to create the
EIOPA. As an introduction, the Commission mentions in Legal Reason 16
of the Proposal for a Regulation that the Court of Justice of the European
Communities, in its Judgment of 2 May 2006 in case C-217/0457 (United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. European Parliament
and Council of the European Union), acknowledges that Article 95 of the
EC Treaty, relating to the adoption of measures for the assimilation of laws
with a view to the establishment and functioning of the internal market,
constitutes a sufficient legal basis for the creation of “a Community body
responsible for contributing to the implementation of a process of
harmonisation.” Therefore, the purpose and tasks of the Authority –
assisting competent national supervisory authorities in the consistent
interpretation and application of Community rules and contributing to
financial stability necessary for financial integration – are closely linked to
the objectives of the Community acquis58 concerning the internal market
for financial services. The European Parliament and the European Council
adopted this legal proof in Legal Reason 16 of the Regulation.

56

See T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN LAW COMMUNITY
LAW 114–18 (5th ed. 2003).
57
Case C-217/04, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v.
European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2006 O.J. (C 143) 8
(EU).
58
The Community acquis is the body of common rights and obligations which
bind all the Member States together within the European Union. It is constantly
evolving and comprises: the content, principles and political objectives of the
Treaties; the legislation adopted in application of the treaties and the case law of
the Court of Justice; the declarations and resolutions adopted by the Union;
measures relating to the common foreign and security policy; measures relating to
justice and home affairs; international agreements concluded by the Community
and those concluded by the Member States between themselves in the field of the
Unions’ activities. Applicant countries have to accept the Community acquis
before they can join the Union. Derivations from the acquis are granted only in
exceptional circumstances and are limited in scope. To integrate into the European
Union, applicant countries will have to transpose the acquis into their national
legislation and implement it from the moment of their accession.
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The same precept introduces extremely comprehensive
authorization for assimilating the legal, regulatory and administrative
regulations of the Member States,59 with the exception of certain matters
such as tax regulations, those covering the free movement of people, and
those affecting employees. This authorization has served, except where
specific prohibitions or limitations are in force, as one of the most
important mechanisms in the extension of Community law. In addition to
this, the development has also been based on the jurisprudential doctrine of
direct effect,60 whereby, except when exercising competences conceded
under the Treaty, the European Union is empowered to go beyond the
explicit competences.
This mechanism, which is also known as the principle of
subsidiarity, implies overriding and going beyond the rigid concept of
competence by direct attribution, and achieving maximum applicability in
all those areas that do not fall either within the domain of national
sovereignty, or within the exclusive competence of the Community.61
Through in-depth analysis of that question, then we must ask
ourselves if there is a sufficient basis of statutory approval to create the
EIOPA according to the aforementioned Article 95. In effect, the
Judgment of 2 May 2006, attempted to resolve the question of whether the
creation of the European Network and Information Security Agency

59

See E. LINDE PANIAGUA, POLÍTICAS DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA 51, 52 (3rd ed.,

2006).
60

See Case 22/70, Comm’n v. Council, 1971 E.C.R. 263. The direct effect of
European law has been enshrined by the Court of Justice in the judgment of Van
Gend en Loos of 5 February 1963. See Case 26/62, Van 198en den Loos v.
Nederlandse Adminstratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1. In this judgment, the
Court states that European law not only engenders obligations for Member States,
but also rights for individuals. Individuals may therefore take advantage of these
rights and directly invoke European acts before national and European courts.
However, it is not necessary for the Member State to adopt the European act
concerned into its internal legal system. There are two aspects to direct effect: a
vertical aspect and a horizontal aspect. Vertical direct effect is of consequence in
relations between individuals and the State. This means that individuals can invoke
a European provision in relation to the State. Horizontal direct effect is
consequential in relations between individuals. This means that an individual can
invoke a European provision in relation to another individual.
61
See MARTIN A. MANGAS & LINAN D.J. NOUGUERAS, Instituciones y
Derecho de la Unión Europea 326–30 (1996).
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(“ENISA”)62 contravenes the EC Treaty, or if Article 95 possesses
sufficient legislative power to establish such a body. According to that
judicial decision, ENISA is a body that does not have the broad powers
similar to those conferred by the Regulation that created EIOPA. Instead,
the legal powers of ENISA are very similar to those of the Committee of
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors, which was
abolished by the new Regulation. ENISA’s functions only extend to
providing information and advice, cooperation, and assistance. In this
regard, the European Parliament Legislative Resolution of 22 September
2010, in which the first or simple reading of the Proposal for a Regulation63
for setting up the Authority that is the subject of the present study is
published, does not elaborate on this question, but rather avoids alluding to
the justification on which the creation of the Authority is based. It would
seem that, in light of this frame of mind, perhaps the Court of Justice of the
European Communities should rule on the issue.
B.

FUNCTIONS

The Regulation is designed to overcome the disadvantages of the
old Committee of Supervisors. The anomalous situation, in our view, in
which the old Committee found itself, due to being a body with
considerable technical potential, but with purely consultative functions, is
resolved by the creation of the new Authority. In this way, then, it is
entrusted, in areas defined by Community law, with the elaboration of draft
regulatory technical standards, which do not involve policy choices. The
Commission should endorse those draft regulatory technical standards in
accordance with Community law in order to give them binding legal force.
At the same time, the process of drawing up technical standards does not
prejudice the Commission’s powers to adopt, on its own initiative,
measures whose application is in accordance with the comitology64
62

Regulation of the European Parliament 460/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 77) 1 (EU).
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
Establishing a European Insurance and the Occupational Pensions Authority,
COM
(2009)
502
final
(Sept.
22,
2010),
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&referenc
e=P7-TA-2010-0334#BKMD-18.
64
Council Decision 1999/486, 1999 O.J. (D 0486) 2 (EC). In accordance with
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Member States
implement European law by adopting measures for implementing legal acts into
their national legislations. In accordance with the principles of subsidiarity and
63
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procedures at level two of the Lamfalussy structure, that are laid down in
the relevant Community legislation.
The new Authority is set up to be a body with legal personality,
without usurping the Commission’s powers, and being accountable to the
proximity, decisions shall be taken as close to the citizens as possible.
Implementing powers may also be attributed to the Commission so that legislation
is implemented uniformly in the Member States, or to the Council for
implementing acts related to the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union, Oct. 26, 2012 O.J. (C
326) 58–59. In exercising its implementing powers, the Commission is assisted by
representatives of the Member States through committees, in accordance with the
“comitology” procedure.
The committees are forums for discussion consisting of representatives from
Member States and are chaired by the Commission. They enable the Commission
to establish dialogue with national administrations before adopting implementing
measures. The Commission ensures that measures reflect as far as possible the
situation in each of the countries concerned.
Relations between the Commission and the committees are based on models set
out in the Council “Comitology Decision.” This decision has been amended
several times. In 1999, it accorded the European Parliament a “right to scrutiny” in
implementing legislative acts adopted by co-decision. It also increased the
transparency of the system by making committee documents more accessible to the
Parliament and the public and by requiring the documents to be registered in a
public register.
Council Decision 2006/512, 2006 O.J. (L 200) 11 (EU). The “Comitology
Decision” was amended again in 2006. It introduced a new way of exercising
implementing powers: the regulatory procedure with scrutiny.
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union, Oct. 26, 2012 O.J.
(C 326) 58–59. The Treaty of Lisbon provides that the relationship between the
Commission and its committees is henceforth organized on the basis of a
regulation adopted by the European Parliament under the ordinary legislative
procedure. Until such a regulation is adopted, the Council “Comitology Decision”
adopted in 2006 is to apply. Committees may be formed in accordance with the
following typology: advisory committees who give their opinions to the
Commission, which must try to take account of them; management committees:
they intervene when implementing measures relate to the management of programs
and when they have budgetary implications; and regulatory committees: they are
responsible when the implementing measures relate to legislation applicable in the
whole of the European Union (EU). Regulatory committees with scrutiny must
allow the Council and the European Parliament to carry out a check prior to the
adoption of measures of general scope designed to amend non-essential elements
of a basic instrument adopted by co-decision.
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European Council and to the European Parliament.65 Ensuring the correct
and full application of Community law is a core prerequisite for the
integrity, transparency, efficiency, and orderly functioning of financial
markets, the stability of the financial system, and for neutral conditions of
competition for financial institutions in the Community, including
protection for the consumer as the end-user.
1. Binding Decisions
Article 17 of the Regulation (EU) No. 1094/2010, establishes a
mechanism, which allows the Authority to deal with cases of incorrect or
insufficient application of Community law. For this purpose, a three-stage
mechanism is created.
In the first stage, the Authority is empowered to investigate alleged
incorrect or insufficient application of Community law obligations by
national authorities in their supervisory practice, concluded by a
recommendation, in which the action necessary to comply with Union law
is set out. The national authority has the obligation to inform the Authority
of the steps it has taken, or intends to take, as a result of the
recommendation.
The second stage begins when the national authority fails to abide
by the recommendation and it is necessary to remedy in a timely manner
such non-compliance in order to maintain or restore neutral conditions of
competition in the market or ensure the orderly functioning and integrity of
the financial system. The Authority may issue an individual decision
addressed to a financial institution requiring the necessary action to comply
with its obligations under Union law including the cessation of any
practice. All of this is without prejudice to the powers of the Commission
under Article 258 TFEU.66
65

This responsibility clause is introduced by Article 1.3 of European
Parliament Legislative Resolution of 22 September 2010, in which the first or
simple reading of the Proposal for a Regulation is published. Proposal for a
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a
European Insurance and the Occupational Pensions Authority, COM (2009) 502
final (Sept. 22, 2010), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2010-0334#BKMD18.
66
This of course according to the consolidated versions of the Treaty on
European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and
their Protocols and Annexes, resulting from the amendments introduced by the
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Finally, the third stage begins when there are adverse
developments which may seriously jeopardize the orderly functioning and
integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the
financial system in the Union. The Authority may adopt individual
decisions requiring competent authorities to take the necessary action, and
requiring financial institutions to take the necessary action to comply with
their obligations under Union law including the cessation of any practice.
2. The Conciliation and Arbitration Function
The Regulation also, in Article 19, endows the Authority with the
function of carrying out arbitration, in order to ensure effective supervision,
and a balanced consideration of the positions held by the national
supervisory authorities of the different Member States. The procedure is
divided into two phases. In the first, a conciliation phase should be
provided for during which the national supervisory authorities may reach
an agreement. At that stage, the Authority shall act as a mediator. If the
authorities fail to reach an agreement, then the second phase is initiated. In
the second, the Authority may take a decision requiring them to take
specific action or to refrain from action in order to settle the matter, in
accordance with Community law. This Decision is binding on the
competent authorities in question in order to ensure compliance with Union
law. The decisions adopted shall prevail over any previous decision
adopted by the competent authorities on the same matter.67
On the basis of this last paragraph, the Authority is to assess
whether it is competent to make a ruling on the resolution of the particular
case. If the Authority considers that it is competent to resolve the
disagreement it will make a ruling. The ruling is binding since, if the
supervisory authority does not conform to this resolution, then the
Authority has the power to adopt an individual decision, addressed to the
Treaty of Lisbon signed on 13 December 2007 in Lisbon, that took effect on 1
December 2009. 2010 O.J. (C 38) 13.
67
Regulation introduced in Art. 11.4.2 of European Parliament Legislative
Resolution of 22 September 2010, in which is published the first or simple reading
of the Proposal for a Regulation. Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council Establishing a European Insurance and the
Occupational Pensions Authority, COM (2009) 502 final (Sept. 22, 2010),
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=
TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2010-0334#BKMD-18
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financial entity, urging it to take the necessary action to comply with its
obligations under Community law including the cessation of any practice.
Finally, from a reading of Article 19, there are two limitations on
this power. In the first place, where there exists in Community law a
remedy for the conflict, or a mechanism for resolving the type of conflict
that falls outside the Authority’s competence, it will refrain from settling
the case and point out to the parties the proper place for the resolution of
the disagreement. The second limitation arises when the Commission
holds the power of resolution over the conflict.
3. Delegation of Tasks and Responsibilities
The Regulation also authorizes the delegation of tasks and
responsibilities in order to reduce the duplication of supervisory tasks, to
foster cooperation and thereby streamline the supervisory process, and to
reduce the burden imposed on financial institutions. Delegation of tasks
means that tasks are carried out by a supervisory authority other than the
responsible authority, while the responsibility for supervisory decisions
remains with the delegating authority. Through the delegation of
responsibilities, a national supervisory authority, the authority delegated to,
should be able to decide upon a certain supervisory matter in the name and
stead of another national supervisory authority.
On this basis,
responsibility may be delegated to the Authority itself or to other
authorities.
Delegations should be governed by the principle of allocating
supervisory competence to a supervisor, which is best technically qualified
to take action. In this respect, the Authority must be informed in order to
issue a prior notice about it, should this in its view be necessary.
4. Regulatory and Implementing Technical Standards
The Authority is empowered to adopt regulatory technical
standards and implementing technical standards under the provisions of
Articles 10 and 15 of the Regulation.
Regulatory technical standards are designed to address technical
issues, and shall not imply strategic decisions or policy choices and their
content shall be delimited by the legislative acts on which they are based.
Before submitting them to the Commission, the Authority shall conduct
open public consultations on draft regulatory technical standards, and
analyse the potential related costs and benefits, unless such consultations
and analyses are disproportionate in relation to the scope and impact of the
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draft regulatory technical standards concerned or in relation to the
particular urgency of the matter.
It is important to note that when the Authority does not submit a
draft regulatory technical standard to the Commission within the time
limits, then the Commission may adopt a regulatory technical standard by
means of a delegated act without a draft from the Authority.
As regards the second type, implementing technical standards shall
be technical, shall not imply strategic decisions or policy choices, because
those subjects are enacted by the European Council or the Commission,
and their content shall be to determine the conditions of application of
those acts. The Authority shall submit its draft implementing technical
standards to the Commission for endorsement. The approval procedure is
the same as that for the approval of regulatory technical standards.
5. The Advisory Function
As we have seen thus far, the Regulation places emphasis on the
creation of an Authority with powers of decision. But, its antecedents as a
consultative body are not abolished and must be kept in mind; rather, those
powers are broadened. In effect, with respect to the field of insurance and
occupational pensions, the Authority functions as a consultative body, not
only as advisor to the Commission, but now also to the European
Parliament, and to the European Council.
Besides, and with the objective of ensuring full effectiveness of the
functioning of the European Systemic Risk Board (“ESRB”)68 and the
68

The ESRB is responsible for the macro-prudential oversight of the financial
system in the EU. One of its main objectives is to prevent and mitigate systemic
risks which might prejudice the financial stability of the EU. In this regard, the
ESRB must in particular: determine and collect the information necessary for its
action; identify systemic risks and prioritize them; issue warnings and make them
public if necessary; recommend measures to be taken once the risks have been
identified. The ESRB is composed of: a General Board to ensure the performance
of tasks; a Steering Committee which contributes to the decision-making process; a
Secretariat responsible for day-to-day business; an Advisory Scientific Committee
and an Advisory Technical Committee to provide advice and assistance. The
President of the European Central Bank (ECB) shall chair the ESRB for a term of
five years. The Chair will perform his duties assisted by two Vice-Chairs, the first
of which shall be elected by and from the General Council of the ECB, while the
second shall be the Chair of the Joint Committee. Members of the ESRB shall have
an obligation to comply with the principles of impartiality and professional secrecy
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follow-up to its warnings and recommendations, the Authority must
provide it with all relevant information. Upon receipt of warnings or
recommendations addressed by the European Systemic Risk Board to the
Authority or a national supervisory authority, the Authority should ensure
follow-up.
C.

INTERNAL ORGANIZATION

Chapter III of the Regulation is entitled “Organisation,” and
contains four sections describing the bodies that constitute EIOPA.
Section 1 authorizes the Board of Supervisors, presided over by
the Chairperson, who is non-voting, and consisting of the heads of the
competent national public authorities of each Member State. The Board’s
function is to give guidance to the work of the Authority and to adopt the
opinions, recommendations and decisions, and to issue the advice referred
to in Chapter II, concerning the Authority’s tasks and responsibilities. The
Board also adopts the Authority’s multi-annual work programme and
exercises disciplinary authority over the Chairperson and Executive
Director, including the power to remove them from office if necessary.
Section 2 creates the Management Board, which is presided over
by the Authority’s Chairperson. The Management Board’s role is to ensure
that the Authority carries out its mission, to propose an annual and multiannual work programme, to exercise its budgetary powers in accordance
with the Regulation, and to adopt the Authority’s staff policy plan.
Section 3 designates the Chairperson, who may be appointed by
the Board of Supervisors, and who may be removed from office only by the
Parliament, following a decision of the Board. The Chairperson’s term of
when performing their duties, including after their duties have ceased. Meetings of
the General Board shall take place four times a year, preceded by meetings of the
Steering Committee. The Chair of the ESRB may convene extraordinary meetings.
The ESRB may also seek the advice of the private sector when necessary. Finally,
The ESRB may issue warnings and make recommendations concerning remedial
action to be adopted, or even legislative initiatives. Such recommendations may be
addressed: to the EU; to one or several Member States; to one or several European
supervisory authorities; to one or several national supervisory authorities.
Recommendations relating to measures to be adopted shall be issued according to a
color code which varies according to the level of risk. If the ESRB observes that its
recommendations have not been followed, it shall, confidentially, inform the
addressees, the Council and, where relevant, the European Supervisory Authority
concerned.
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office is five years and may be extended once. The Chairperson shall
neither seek nor take instructions from Union institutions or bodies, from
any government of a Member State, or from any other public or private
body.
Section 4 creates the post of the Executive Director, who is
appointed by the Board of Supervisors, on the basis of merit, skills,
knowledge of financial institutions and markets, and experience relevant to
financial supervision and regulation and managerial experience, following
an open selection procedure. The Executive Director is in charge of the
management of the Authority and prepares the work of the Management
Board. The Executive Director is also responsible for implementing the
annual work programme of the Authority, and shall take the necessary
measures, notably the adoption of internal administrative instructions and
the publication of notices, to ensure the functioning of the Authority.
Finally, each year the Executive Director shall prepare a draft report with a
section on the regulatory and supervisory activities of the Authority and a
section on financial and administrative matters.
D.

BODIES SET UP BY THE REGULATION

Chapter IV, dealing with Joint Bodies of the European Supervisory
Authorities, establishes in its Section 1 the Joint Committee of European
Supervisory Authorities and in its Section 2 the Board of Appeal.
The purpose of the Joint Committee is to serve as a forum in which
the Authority shall cooperate regularly and closely and ensure crosssectoral consistency with the European Banking Authority and the
European Securities and Markets Authority. It is composed of the
Chairperson of the Authority and the Chairpersons of the Authorities
aforementioned. Within the Committee there shall be a Sub-Committee on
financial conglomerates and further Sub-Committees as may be deemed
necessary.
The Board of Appeal shall be a joint body of the European
Banking Authority, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions
Authority and the European Securities and Markets Authority. It shall be
composed of six members and six alternates with a proven record of
relevant knowledge and experience, excluding current staff of the
competent authorities or other national or Community institutions involved
in the activities of the Authority. Any natural or legal person, including
competent authorities, may appeal a decision of the Authority. Such an
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appeal shall not have suspensive69 effect. Finally, decisions taken by the
Board of Appeal may be contested before the Court of Justice of the
European Union, in accordance with Article 263 TFEU.
X.

CONCLUSION

The history of the succession Committees up to the present day,
namely those concerned with the whole field of financial services is
commendable for the attempts to achieve convergence between the
different national standards. In effect, in the context of the multiplicity of
standards and of the fragmented nature of the market within the
Community, actually being able to find the point of inflection, where those
regulations can coincide with a view to constructing a unified market, is no
mean feat. In our opinion, developing the Committees for the purpose of
promoting their technical advice was the source of the great profusion of
working materials from which it has been possible to construct a common
supervisory and regulatory body.
Along with all this material, the Lamfalussy process and its review
have led to the amendment of a broad spectrum of directives aimed at
unifying supervisory criteria as the conditio sine qua non for the attainment
of this common market. The creation of a single supra-national Authority
can be regarded as the high point of an entire process of unification of
principles of finance that provides this body with the power to issue
resolutions without having any destabilizing effect, both in Community and
in national markets. Certainly, the different intra-community markets, in
spite of their interconnections, and taking account of their particular
individual nature and characteristics, cannot allow themselves to be
affected by the decision of a supra-national body that upsets a given market
and distorts the ends it is designed to serve. This is why the work of
legislative convergence is a ceaseless task, and involves constant
assessment of its consequences.
It is also the case that the Lamfalussy process constitutes a major
challenge in supra-Community terms. The increasing globalization that we
are experiencing today, makes easier the movement and investment of
foreign capital, both to create new enterprises and to develop existing ones.
This is why one of the objectives of the process has been to project to the
outside world the image of a strong and solid Community market, which,
69

It means that the Decisions enacted by the Authority can be implemented,
and the appeals cannot stop the Decision’s effects.
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thanks to this appearance, is able to attract investors who are willing to
participate in a business environment that is secure, both from the point of
view of standards and of economic prospects. As a result, the regulation
and supervision of insurance and of the other financial services needs to be
developed in such a way as to simultaneously promote mutual confidence
between the different supervisors, with a view to avoiding having investors
perceive distortions or tensions concerned with legislation. In this respect,
the creation of the Committee of Supervisors by the Decision of 23 January
2009 promoted the move towards convergence of the different national
supervisors. That was in our view a very successful move, in that the
Committee embodied the supra-national ethos that was needed to permeate
supervisory practice in the nations. As we can see, that drawing together
has not yet been achieved as fully as would be desired.
The reluctance, on the part of national authorities to relinquish
competences in matters of financial market governance has been a constant
factor, in spite of the aspiration towards integration. The European Council
included in its conclusions of 19 June 2009 reference to the standstill in the
financial market. The Council was of the view that it would be helpful to
take a further step forward in this matter and to set up a supra-national
supervisory body that would at least draw together the functions of the
national supervisors, even if this were initially in a somewhat tentative
manner.
The new European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority
is constituted as a joint body, because of the disparity of the tasks attributed
to it by the Proposal for a Regulation. The advisory function, the oversight
of the incorrect or insufficient application of Community law, the
production of proposals, and the delegation of functions, all lead us to
suspect that in the future this Authority will be the sole supervisory body
operating in all Member States. This is also likely true for the similar
arrangements governing banking supervision and securities regulation. For
sure, it seems likely that we are progressing towards a new conception as
regards the supervision and regulation of insurance in our country, or
perhaps what we are witnessing is another step towards Community-wide
integration.

